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The 2003 Legislative Session (and
subsequent special sessions) having been
dominated by Nevada's impending budgetary
crisis, revising Nevada's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code was not a priority
in Carson City. By the time the 2005
Legislative Session begins, the American Law
Institute (ALI) and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) will have finalized comprehensive
revisions of Articles 1 ("General Provisions"),
2 ("Sales"), 2A ("Leases"), and 7 ("Documents
of Title"), as well as, conforming amendments
to other articles, for the Nevada Legislature's
consideration.
The ALl and NCCUSL completed their
work on Revised Article 1 after Nevada's 2001
Legislative Session adjourned. As of June 1,
2004, Alabama, Idaho, Minnesota, Texas, and
Virginia have enacted their own versions of
Revised Article 1, and Hawaii's version awaits
only gubernatorial approval. The ALl and
NCCUSL completed their work on Revised
Article 7 after Nevada's 2003 Legislative
Session adjourned. As of June 1, 2004,
Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland,
Minnesota, and Virginia have enacted their
own versions of Revised Article 7, and
Hawaii's version awaits only gubernatorial
approval. As of June 1, 2004, the official
comments accompanying Revised Articles 2
and 2A have yet to be finalized. Therefore, it
seems a bit premature at present to write about
Revised Articles 2 and 2A. And, while
documents of title are, no doubt, scintillating
subjects to some, this article and its
companion focus on the proposed changes to
Article 1, which affect every transaction
governed by the Code.
As I will discuss in more detail below,
there are four essential differences between
Revised Article 1 and the version of Article 1
presently codified at N.R.S. §§ 104.1101-
.1208. First, Revised Article 1 narrows its own
scope, so that it applies only to transactions
governed by some other article of the Code.
Second, Revised Article 1 applies the same
good faith standard to merchants and non-
merchants. Third, Revised Article 1 purports
to allow the parties in any transaction in
which no party is a consumer to choose to
have their transaction governed by the law of
any state, without regard to any relationship
(or lack thereof) between that state and either
the parties to the transaction or to the transac-
tion itself. Fourth, Revised Article 1 extends
the relevance of course of performance
evidence to all agreements governed by the
Code.
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: The
Scope of Revised Article 1
Unlike current Article 1, which contains
no explicit scope provision, U.C.C. § Rl-102'
states that Revised Article 1 only "applies to a
transaction to the extent that it is governed by
another article of [the Code."2 In other words,
if a transaction does not fall within the scope
of Article 2, 2A, 3, 4, 4A, 5, 7, 8, or 9, it is not
subject to Revised Article 1.
This is a departure from current law,
notwithstanding the statement by Revised
Article l's drafters that Section Rl-102 merely
"makes clear what has always been the case -
the rules in Article 1 apply [only] to transac-
tions ... governed by one of the other articles
of the Uniform Commercial Code."3 N.R.S. §
104.1206 requires a signed writing evidencing
a contract (other than a security agreement)
for the sale of personal property (other than
goods and investment securities) if a party
wishes to enforce that contract "beyond
$5,000 in amount or value of remedy."4 In so
doing, N.R.S. § 104.1206 implicitly recognizes
that Article 1 governs sales of personal
property that fall outside the scope of Articles
2, 2A, 3, 4, 4A, 5, 7, 8, and 9. If that were not
the case, there would be no need for N.R.S. §
104.1206, and one of the fundamental canons
of statutory construction is that one should
always construe a statute to have meaning and
purpose. 5 What the text of N.R.S. § 104.1206
makes implicit, the official comment to
current Section 1-206 makes explicit, stating
that its purpose is to "fill the gap" left by
statute of frauds provisions elsewhere in the
Code - principally "relat[ing] to the sale of
general intangibles,"6 such as intellectual
property rights,7 goodwill and other intangi-
bles included in the sale of a going business
concern,8 franchise rights,9 and "choses in
action,"10 as well as to sales of other forms of
intangible personal property not covered by
another Code provision."
If It's Good Enough for Sears
Roebuck, It's Good Enough for Me:
Good Faith Under Revised Article 1
Both current and Revised Article 1
impose on all parties to any agreement
governed by the Code a duty of good
faith in their performance and enforce-
ment of the agreement.1 2 Other than
changing "or" to "and," in order to
make clear that the duty of good faith
applies to both contractual performance
and enforcement, and changing the
verbiage used to refer to the rest of the
Code, the language of the pre-revised
and revised sections imposing a duty of
good faith are identical. What is not
identical is the way the current version
of Article 1 and Revised Article 1
define "good faith." N.R.S. § 104.1201
defines good faith as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." 13 Thus, the question under
current Article 1 is whether the person
was subjectively truthful and behaved
honestly.14 In addition to this require-
ment of subjective honesty, under
Revised Article 1 the party must also
"observ[e] reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing."15 Thus,
Revised Article 1 applies the same
standard of good faith to non-merchants
that current Articles 2 and 2A apply
only to merchants.16
Suppose I sign a contract to
purchase a home spa from Sears and
that I further agree to make monthly
payments for a fixed term, to maintain
the spa for the duration of the payment
period, and to promptly notify Sears of
any non-routine maintenance needs
that arise for the duration of the express
warranty that is part of the sales
agreement. Under Revised Article 1,
not only must Sears (the merchant
seller) observe reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing, so must I (the
non-merchant buyer) - even though I
may have no reason to know what
constitutes "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing" in the sale and
servicing of home spas. If reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in
the performance of a contract for the
sale and servicing of a home spa require
that I inspect the home spa every few
days, and I fail to inspect the spa for a
two week period because I am on
vacation, when I return home and find
the spa not working as warranted, am I
breaching my duty of good faith by
insisting that Sears make good on its
warranty? Revised Article l's reason-
able-person-with-knowledge-of-the-
trade standard suggests I am in breach.7
Where do You Want to Go Today?:
Choice of Law Under Revised Article
I
Both current and Revised Article 1
empower the parties to agree on
governing law, subject to certain limita-
tions. Where current and Revised
Article 1 part ways is that, while
current Article 1 requires the parties to
choose the law of a jurisdiction that is
reasonably related to the transaction,18
Revised Article 1 requires no such
relationship between the transaction
and the chosen jurisdiction,19 unless
one or more parties to the agreement at
issue is a consumer.20 In so doing,
Revised Article 1 ignores the general
tendency of states to allow parties to
choose only the law of a jurisdiction
bearing some relationship to the parties,
to the transaction, or both, and then
only if the chosen law does not conflict
with some fundamental public policy of
a state bearing a greater relationship to
the dispute than the chosen state.21 As
one leading commentator puts it,
Section R1-301 is "far broader, cover[s]
far more contracts, and (by sheer force
of numbers of contracts implicated) [is]
less deferential to the ordinarily-
governing law of other jurisdictions
than any widely-known conflict of laws
rule[] anywhere."22
Returning to my earlier hypotheti-
cal, if Sears is headquartered in Illinois,
I am a Nevada resident, and I purchase
the home spa from a Sears store in Las
Vegas, then a provision in the sales
agreement subjecting all disputes to
Maine law would not be binding
because I am a consumer. But, if Sears
purchased the spa for resale from The
Wizard of Spas, located in Kansas, and
had the spa shipped directly to the
Nevada store, then a provision in the
Sears-Wizard of Spas agreement subject-
ing all disputes to Maine law would be
binding because neither party is a
consumer.
Second Verse Same as the First:
Course of Performance Under Revised
Article 1
The text of current Article 1 refers
to course of performance only as one
possible element of an "agreement."23
Otherwise, course of performance is
defined and operationalized in Articles
2 and 2A.24 As a result, there has been
some uncertainty what effect course of
performance has on transactions
governed by Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 8, or
9; and, assuming it has some effect
beyond Articles 2 and 2A, how course
of performance fits into the hierarchy
set forth in pre-Revised Section 1-205.25
Revised Article 1 resolves any
uncertainty by defining course of
performance and fixing its position in
the hierarchy of express and implied
terms of any agreement governed by the
Code.6 N_
Part Two of this article, which will
appear in next month's Nevada Lawyer,
discusses other states' enactments of
Revised Article I and suggests one or more
courses of action for the Nevada
Legislature with respect to each of the
changes examined here.
Endnotes
1. For ease of reference, from this point
forward, all citations in the text and notes to
Revised Article 1 are in the form of "U.C.C.
§ R1-..." or "Section R1-....' All citations in
the text and notes to pre-Revised Article 1
will be to the relevant provision of the
Nevada Revised Statutes, where possible;
otherwise, they will be in the form of
"U.C.C. § 1-..." or "Section 1-...." The pre-
2001 uniform version of Article 1 can be
found in its entirety, with official comments,
in Uniform Laws Annotated. 1 U.L.A. §§ 1-
101 to 1-208 (1989 & Supp. 2004). The
uniform version of Revised Article 1 can be
found in its entirety, with official comments,
in the 2004 Supplement to Uniform Laws
Annotated. 1 U.L.A. §§ RI-101 to R1-310
(Supp. 2004).
2. U.C.C. § RI-102 (2001). And, in case
you weren't paying attention, Section RI-301
reiterates that it - which, of course, is part of
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Revised Article 1, and therefore covered by §
Rl-102 - "applies to a transaction to the
extent that it is governed by another article
of [the UCC]." Id. § Rl-301(b).
3. Id. § R1-102 cmt. l; see also Kathleen
Patchel & Boris Auerbach, The Article I
Revision Process, 54 SMU L. REV. 603, 605
(2001) (recognizing that, while current
Article l's scope "implicitly ... has always
been that it only governs transactions within
the scope of other articles of the UCC .... the
lack of an express scope provision occasional-
ly caused courts and commentators to express
uncertainty about which transactions are
governed by its substantive rules").
4. NEv. REV. STAT. § 101.1206(1)-(2).
5. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950)
("If a statute is to make sense, it must be read
in the light of some assumed purpose. A
statute merely declaring a rule, with no
purpose or objective, is nonsense.").
6. U.C.C. § 1-206 cmt. (1995).
7. See, e.g., Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A., 56 E3d 427, 431 (2d Cir.
1995); Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 P.
Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David
Crystal, Inc., 463 F2d 1141, 1143 (3d Cir.
1972); Beldengreen v. Ashinsky, 528
N.Y.S.2d 744, 746-47 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
9. See, e.g., American Buick, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp., 66 S.W.3d 51, 60-61 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001).
10. See, e.g., Sel-Lab Mktg., Inc. v. Dial
Corp., 48 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 482, 485-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (right of first refusal); see
also In re Furst, 914 E Supp. 734, 737 (D.
Mass. 1996) (royalty rights).
11. See, e.g., FDIC v. Herald Square Fabrics
Corp., 439 N.Y.S.2d 944, 951-52 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981) (sale of chattel paper not given as
collateral).
12. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 104.1203; U.C.C.
§ R1-304.
13. NEV. REv. STAT. § 104.1201(19),
14. See Margaret L. Moses, The New
Definition of Good Faith in Revised Article 1,35
U.C.C.L.J. 47, 48-49 (2002).
15. U.C.C. § Rl-201(b)(20) ("'Good faith'
... means honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.").
16. Compare NEv. REv. STAT. § 104.2103(1)
(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." (emphasis added)) and
id. § 104A.2103(3) (incorporating N.R.S. §
104.2103's good faith standard by reference)
with id. § 104.1201(19) (.'Good faith' means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."). See generally Moses, supra note
14, at 51-52.
17. See generally Moses, supra note 14, at 50-
51 (reaching a similar conclusion juxtaposing
the "honesty in fact" test of former U.C.C.
Article 3 with the "honesty in fact and ...
observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing" test of current
U.C.C. § 3-103(1)(d)). If so, my breach will
not give Sears independent grounds to
recover from me, but it may well give Sears a
defense to excuse it from liability for its
breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § R1-304
cmt. 1; see also Moses, supra note 14, at 48
n.6.
18. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. § 104.1105(1)
("Except as otherwise provided in this
section, when a transaction bears a reason-
able relation to this state and also to another
state or nation, the parties may agree that the
law of this state or of such other state or
nation governs their rights and duties.").
19. See U.C.C. § R1-301(c)(1) (allowing
the parties to choose a state's law "whether or
not the transaction bears a relation to the
State designated").
20. See id. § R1-301(e)(1).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFCT OF LAws § 187(2) (1971)
(amended 1989); see, e.g., Sievers v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors, 603 P.2d 270,
273 (Nev. 1979) ("Under choice-of-law
principles, parties are permitted within broad
limits to choose the law that will determine
the validity and effect of their contract. The
situs fixed by the agreement, however, must
have a substantial relation with the transac-
tion, and the agreement must not be contrary
to the public policy of the forum." (citations
omitted)).
22. William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual
Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of
Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 740
(2001). Professor Woodward elaborates:
The Article 1 provision states a rule for
any case subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code, unless displaced by a specified
provision elsewhere in the UCC. This means
that all sales and leases of goods contracts
will be covered, as will contracts in all the
other areas covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code. Thus the provision will
be available for a large percentage of the
staggeringly large number of commercial
contracts formed in our economy every day.
There are no size or value limitations. Parties
to every commercial contract from the sale to
a carpenter of a screwdriver to the large-scale
business liquidation sale will be able to
choose unrelated law to cover their transac-
tion.
Id. at 740-41 (footnotes omitted).
23. NEv. REv. STAT. § 104.1201(3). The
official comments to a few sections of current
Article I mention course of performance;
but, they generally do so in the context of
discussing the meaning of "agreement," see
U.C.C. §§ 1-102 cmt. 2 & 1-204 cmt. 2; and,
like the definition of "agreement," they refer
the reader seeking the meaning of "course of
performance" to U.C.C. § 2-208, see U.C.C.
§§ 1-102 cmt. 2 & 1-205 cmt. 2.
24. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 104.2208 &
104A.2207.
25. See id. § 104.1205(4); compare, e.g.,
National Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz,
653 P.2d 1243 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982)
(affirming the trial court's resort to course of
performance evidence in resolving a dispute
governed by Article 9) with, e.g., Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor
Sales, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. 1968)
("[U.C.C. § 2-2081 deals with sales only. As
to secured transactions the code apparently
does not contain a rule for varying the
contract by performance.").
26. U.C.C. § RL-303(a), (d) & (e). See
generally Patchel & Auerbach, supra note 3,
at 610 ("Although the comments to pre-
revision Section 1-205 refer to course of
performance, the section itself deals with
only course of dealing and usage of trade.
The Revision remedies this omission by
adding course of performance to course of
dealing and usage of trade as relevant in
ascertaining the meaning of the parties'
agreement and supplementing its express
terms." (footnote omitted)).
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